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Introduction 
 
Nowadays there is a general consensus among economists that institutions (defined in North 
1990 as “the rules of the game in a society” or “the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction”) are key determinants of countries’  economic  performances  and help  to 
explain  prevailing  patterns  of prosperity and levels  of GDP  per capita (GDPpc) around the 
world. 
 
Since the ground-breaking contributions by North and Thomas (1973) and North (1981), the 
impact  of  institutions  on  economic  prosperity  and  growth  has  captured  the  interest  of  an 
increasing number of authors. All these authors inspired the research programs  initiated by 
many institutions, including the World Bank, which started the major project, Doing Business, 
aimed  at  measuring  transaction  costs  generated  by  business  rules  and  administrative 
procedures  applying  to  domestic  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs).  Nowadays, 
Doing  Business  is  accepted  as  one  the  standard  tools  for  quantifying  the  impact  of 
regulations on economic activities. The goal underlying  Doing Business is to corroborate the 
causal  association  between  better  institutions  on  one  side  and,  respectively,  economic 
prosperity and growth on the other based on statistical evidence:  in  this  sense  the  statement 
in  the  report  entitled  Doing  Business  in 2006: Creating Jobs: “the indicators are used to 
analyze economic outcomes and identify what reforms have worked, where, and why” (Doing 
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Abstract: It is widely acknowledged that firms require an efficient regulatory environment: 
if transaction costs generated by business regulations are not onerous, firms grow more 
and  develop  more  quickly,  attract  more  foreign  direct  investment,  and  employ  more 
workers. But what does it induce alterations in the basic institutional framework? In this 
paper  we  intend to  test North’s thesis by  which  as trade expands and the size of  the 
market grows, transaction costs increase requiring that more and more resources should 
be devoted to improving existing regulations  and,  then,  reducing  such  costs.  The  paper 
is  structured  as  follows.  Section  1  introduces.  Section  2  provides  the  theoretical 
background.  Section  3,  based  on  World  Bank  data  on  30  Chinese  cities,  investigates 
whether there is a correlation  at  urban  and  provincial  levels  between  efficient  business 
regulations on one side and economic outcomes (gross domestic product, foreign direct 
investment,  employment,  etc.)  on  the  other.  Section  4  addresses  the  pilot  question 
mentioned  above  and  tests  whether  simpler  and  less  costly  ways  of  meeting  legal 
requirements  for  starting  and  running  a  business  are  associated with long-run trade. 
Section 5 discusses results in the light of theoretically assumed causal links and proposes 
a  2SLS  regression  model,  whereby  a  geographical  instrumental  variable  is  used  to 
investigate the causal relationship between business regulations and exports. 
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Business 2006, i). 
 
To note that for better institutions the Doing Business team mean more efficient, in terms of  
generated transaction costs for firms, business rules and administrative procedures (such as 
completing business start-up formalities through a one-stop shop). 
 
The reliance on such a theoretically assumed causal relationship between better institutions 
(i.e., more  efficient  business  regulations)  and  economic  outcomes implies  the  answer  to  a 
fundamental  research  question:  What  does  it  induce  alteration  in  the  basic  institutional 
framework? We  focus  on  a  specific  strand  in the  institutional  theoretical  frame.  According 
to  North  (1991),  as  trade  expands and the size of markets grows, transaction costs increase 
requiring that more and more  resources  should  be  devoted  to  improving  existing  regulations 
and, then, reducing such costs. 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 1 introduces. Section 2 provides  the theoretical 
background. Section 3, based on World Bank data on 30 Chinese cities, investigates whether 
there is a correlation between efficient business regulations  on  one  side  and,  respectively, 
income levels and rates, exports, FDI and employment on the other. As far as we know there 
are not so many attempts to test such a correlation at urban and provincial levels. Section 4 
addresses the pilot question mentioned above and tests whether simpler and less costly ways 
of meeting  legal  requirements  for  starting  and  running  a  business  are  associated with long-
run trade: we proxy long-run trade in Chinese cities with the volume of urban level exports, 
estimated using a location quotient approach per number of employees in the manufacturing 
sector.  Section 5  discusses  correlations among our  three sets  of  variables  (long-run  trade, 
business regulations and income levels) in the light of theoretically assumed causal links and 
proposes a 2SLS model between business regulations (dependent) and exports (independent) 
making use of a geographical variable (the inverse of closeness to sea of each capital times 
the number of ports in the related province) as instrument. Attempting to estimate the causal 
effect of exports on business regulations, we derive that the geographical variable affects the 
latter only through its effect on the former. If the inverse of closeness to sea times the number 
of ports only affects  rules  because  it  affects  exports  (holding  other  variables  in  the 
model fixed), correlation  between  the geographical  variable  and  business  rules  is evidence 
that  exports  cause  changes  in  the  business  regulatory  environment. Our results, though 
preliminary and somehow speculative (lacking a larger dataset), intend to add to the literature 
on institutions and economic outcomes. 
 
The theoretical background 
 
As stated by Acemoglu et al. (2001: 1369) developed countries with “better institutions, more 
secure property rights and less distortionary policies will invest more in physical and human 
capital, and will use these factors more efficiently to achieve a greater level of income” (in this 
sense, see also Jones 1981). 
 
This  view  has  received  wide  support  from  several  cross-country  studies  investigating  the 
correlation  between  institutions  and  aggregate  incomes  (see Hall and Jones 1999; Easterly 
and Levine 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2004). Since it is likely that rich economies 
choose or can afford better institutions, these latter constitute both the cause and the result of 
income levels. Nonetheless,  as  well  stated  by  Rodrik  (2004):  “Institutions  are  causal  in 
the sense that a poor country that is able to revise the rules of the game in the direction of 
strengthening the property rights of entrepreneurs and investors is likely to experience a lasting 
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increase in its productive capacity” (Rodrik 2004: 1). 
 
Beyond the studies which have shown that institutions are associated to countries’ prosperity, 
there are many researchers who concentrated on the link between  institutions  and  economic 
growth  (see,  inter  alia,  Djankov  et  al.  2006, Stel et al. 2007, Ardagna and Lusardi 2008, 
Aldashev 2009). 
 
In the late  1990s,  while  investigating  the development  of financial markets,  La Porta  et  al. 
(1998)  identified  and  constructed  three  blocks  of  variables:  quality  of  countries’  legal 
frameworks, development of financial markets and growth of economies.  Assuming  that  the 
US  model  is  the  benchmark  for  “good”  financial  markets,  and  that  extensive  financial 
markets produce growth, the authors found a significant and positive correlation between the 
quality of countries’ legal frameworks and economic growth. Since then interest in the impact of 
regulation on  growth  rates  has  increased:  Djankov  et  al.  (2002),  for  example,  found  that 
while  the  total  cost  of  opening  a  medium-size  business  vary  greatly  among  countries:  for 
example,  in  1999  this  total  cost  was  less  than  0.02%  of  national GDPpc in the United 
States and around 4.95% in the Dominican Republic (see also Djankov et al. 2003; Botero et 
al. 2004; La Porta et al. 2006). 
 
In 2003 La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny, and Djankov (the creator of the  Doing 
Business  project)  transformed  the  model  into  a  more  general  theory and published “The 
New  Comparative  Economics”.  In  this  work,  the  authors  assumed  a  strict  relationship 
between  good  rules  and  economic  development and  deduced  that  countries  lacking 
protection  for  investors  (because  of  weak legal rules or poor enforcement of rules) would 
suffer economically. 
 
All these articles inspired the research program Doing Business by the World Bank. Its aim is 
to  confirm  the  association  between  better  institutions  (meant  as  more  efficient  business 
regulations) on one side and, respectively, economic prosperity and growth on the other based 
on  statistical  evidence.  Understanding  the  relevance  of  institutions  on  economic  outcomes 
implies the answer to a fundamental research question: What does it induce alteration in the 
basic institutional framework? 
 
According to North (1991), as trade expands and the size of markets grows, transaction costs 
increase  requiring  that  more  and  more  resources  should  be  devoted  to  improving  existing 
regulations and, then, reducing such costs. This thesis  is  rooted  in  the  1950s,  when  North 
(1955)  suggested  that  the  economic growth of a region is tied to the success of its export 
trade (he criticised the literature  on  the  sequence  of  development  stages  in  a  region  and 
stressed  the  relevance  of  exports).  Several  decades  later  North  (1991)  makes  use  of  the 
concept of export base to emphasise the role of institutional structures based on reasoning 
related to the several stages of development in a local community. North (1991) starts with 
local exchanges in a village: in this context specialization is very low because most individuals 
are self-sufficient; an ensemble of informal social  constraints  determines  low  transaction 
costs  which  enable  trade  on  a village scale. As specialisation increases and the size of the 
market grows beyond the single village the informal social network is replaced, and possibilities 
for conflicts over exchanges, and transaction costs, increase. In this stage of development, 
more resources are required to measure and enforce transactions. In North’s (1991: 99) words: 
 
“The growth  of  long  distance  trade  poses  two  distinct  transaction  cost  problems. One  is  a 
classical problem of agency, which historically was met by use of kin in long-distance trade  
Does an Efficient Business Regulatory Environment Matter at Urban Level ? Some Evidence  
from Chinese City 
29  
 
 
 
  As  the  size  and  volume  of  trade  grew,  agency  problems became an increasingly major 
dilemma. A second problem consisted of contract negotiation and enforcement in alien parts of 
the world, where there is no easily available way to achieve agreement and enforce contracts. 
Enforcement means not only such enforcement of agreements but also protection of the goods 
and services en route from pirates, brigands, and so on”. 
 
North (1991: 100) concludes reasoning by underlining the need for formal rules: 
 
“Such  societies  need  effective,  impersonal  contract  enforcement,  because  personal  ties, 
voluntaristic  constraints,  and  ostracism  are  no  longer  effective  as  more  complex  and 
impersonal forms of exchange emerge. It is not that these personal and social alternatives are 
unimportant; they are still significant even in today’s interdependent world. But in the absence 
of effective impersonal contracting, the gains from “defection” are great enough to forestall the 
development of complex exchange”. 
 
North  (1991:  109)  provides  the  example  of  the  Champagne  Fairs  (as  representing  long-
distance trade in Europe) to show how some communities evolve from less complex to more 
complex forms of exchange: 
 
“while  a  merchant  at  a  medieval  European  Fair  would  certainly  gain  from  acquiring  [better 
information  on  opportunities  and  having  greater  bargaining  skills  than  other  traders,  since 
profitable opportunities came from being better informed and being a more skilled bargainer 
than  other  traders],  he  would  gain  also  from  devising  ways  to  bond  fellow  merchants,  to 
establish merchant courts, to induce princes to protect goods from  brigandage in return for 
revenue, to devise ways to discount bills of exchange. His investment in knowledge and skills 
would  gradually  and  incrementally  alter  the  basic  institutional  framework.  Note  that  the 
institutional evolution entailed not only voluntary organizations that expanded trade and made 
exchange more productive, but also the development of the state to take over protection and 
enforcement  of  property  rights  as  impersonal  exchange  made  contract  enforcement 
increasingly costly for voluntary organizations which lacked effective coercive power”. 
 
At  this  stage  it  is  useful  to  illustrate  the  adopted  notion  of  institutions  and  our  proposed 
extension to North’s thesis. First, in this paper institutions are business rules and administrative 
procedures  related  to starting  a  business,  registering property,  getting  credit  and  enforcing 
contracts.  Secondly,  we  share  the  view  by  which  long-run  trade  implies  more  chances  of 
conflicts, agency problems, commercial risks and uncertainty for firms: if  this is  true,  public 
authorities  need  to  activate  for  the  provision  of  a  more  efficient  business  regulatory 
environment in order to compensate for the higher transaction costs which typically arise when 
business  develops  outside  the  urban  or  provincial  borders.  In other  words,  where long-run 
trade is high public authorities need to assist firms more efficiently generating lower transaction 
costs through adopted rules and procedures (i.e., one stop shop process for business start-up 
formalities; less expensive bureaucratic procedures; and so on). 
 
Transaction costs,  business regulations and economic performance  
in Chinese  cities 
 
The  research  project  Doing  Business  in  China  2008  provides  quantitative  measures  of 
business regulations for SMEs in 30 Chinese cities in four areas or items: starting a business, 
registering property, getting credit (creating and registering collateral) and enforcing contracts. 
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In order to make data comparable across cities and/or countries, the Doing Business team 
studied  a  specific  type  of  company  -  generally  a  limited  liability  company.  In  constructing 
indicators, the team assumes that entrepreneurs are knowledgeable about and comply with the 
regulations in place, although, in practice, entrepreneurs might decide to either become formal 
entities (spending time finding out where to go and what documents to submit) or remain in the 
informal economy (e.g. avoiding legally required procedures by not registering their property). 
 
Doing  Business  encompasses  two types  of  data: the first  come from  readings  of laws  and 
regulations;  the  second  are  “time  and  motion”  indicators  that  measure  the  efficiency  of 
achieving  a  regulatory  goal.  The  time  and  motion  indicators record cost estimates from 
official fee schedules where applicable. This builds on Hernando de Soto’s work which applies 
this approach to show the obstacles to setting up a garment factory in the periphery of Lima in 
the  1980s.  Some  of  the Doing  Business  indicators  give higher  scores for simpler  and  less 
costly ways of meeting legal requirements for starting and running a business. 
 
The subnational Doing Business report on China captures differences in business regulations 
across  30  different  cities:  22  provincial  capitals  (Hefei,  Fuzhou,  Lanzhou,  Guangzhou, 
Guiyang, Haikou, Shijiazhuang, Harbin, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, Nanjing,  Nanchang, 
Changchun, Shenyang, Hangzhou,  Xi'an,  Jinan, Taiyuan,  Chengdu,  Kunming  and Xining),  4 
capitals  of  autonomous  regions  (Urumqi,  Nanning,  Yinchuan  and  Hohhot,  respectively  for 
Xinjiang,  Guangxi,  Ningxia  and  Inner  Mongolia)  and  the  4  large  municipalities  of  Beijing, 
Shanghai,  Tianjin  and  Chongqing.  For each  of  these  cities,  Table  1  presents  the following 
information: number of procedures, number of days, costs (as a percentage of GDPpc in the 
location) and minimum capital investment (as a percentage of GDPpc) required to start a new 
business; number of procedures, number of days, costs (as a percentage of property value) 
required to register a property;  number  of  days  and  costs  of  setting  up  a  credit  guarantee 
(calculated  as a percentage of the loan value); number of procedures, number of days and 
costs (as a percentage of the debt) to enforce a contract. 
 
Measured  by  the  above  indicators,  coastal  cities  perform  better  than  cities  in other 
geographic  regions.  According  to  the  methodology  used  by  Doing  Business,  rankings  are 
calculated by ordering the resulting average of the percentile  rankings  of  each  city  for  each 
of  the  four  items  (starting  a  business, registering property, getting credit, and enforcing a 
contract).  The  rankings  for  each  item  are  based  on  the  simple  average  of  the  percentile 
rankings of its component indicators: thus, the ranking for “starting a business” is an average of 
the  city’s  ranking  for  number  of  procedures,  number  of  days,  costs  and  minimum  capital 
requirement to register a business (on the methodology, see Djankov et al.  2004).  In short, 
lower  values  of  the  percentile  rankings  would  indicate  more efficient  business  rules  and 
administrative  procedures:  to  bear  in  mind  that  in what follows we multiply times -1 to get 
higher values for more efficient regulations. For example, the Province of Jiangsu (Najisung 
City) in the southeast  scores  0.04  in  the  percentile  ranking  for  ease  of  starting  a  business 
(then, in our empirical investigation it becomes -0.04), 0.19 for ease of registering the property 
(-0.19),  0.03  for  obtaining    credit  (-0.03),  0.07  for  contract  enforcement  (-0.07),  giving  an 
overall 0.09 for ease of doing business in China (- 0.09), making it the best performer in China. 
 
We  test  the  thesis  underlying  Doing  Business:  when  business  regulations  are  particularly 
onerous, in terms of time and cost, the size of the informal sector grows.  Informal  activity 
implies  that  firms  typically  grow  less  and  grow  more slowly, attract less FDI, employ fewer 
workers, and so on. We use urban level data and link some basic economic indicators  
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(logarithmic transformations of, respectively, income levels, growth rates, FDI and employment) 
to institutional performance, meant as more efficient business regulations (see Table 4). For 
institutional  performance,  we  average  the  percentile  rankings  for  each  item,  that is,  the 
average  of  the  percentile  rankings  of  the component  indicators  times  -1 (see last column in 
Table 2). 
Table 2 
Institutional variables in Chinese cities: percentile rankings for each area 
  Source: World Bank (2008) 
 
Table 3 shows data on the economic performance of Chinese provinces, autonomous regions 
and large municipalities: GDP (expressed in 100 millions of yuan)  at  year  2008,  “GDP”;  GDP 
per  capita  (yuan  per  person)  at  year  2008,  “GDPpc”;  Primary  Industry  Percentage 
(expressed  in  100  millions  of  yuan),  “I ind”; Secondary Industry Percentage (expressed in 
100  millions  of  yuan),  “II  ind”;  Tertiary  Industry  Percentage  (expressed  in  100  millions  of  
yuan), “III ind”; Variation on percentage of GDP per capita between 1996 and 2008, “∆GDPpc”; 
Amount of foreign capital utilised (expressed in USD 10,000s) in 2007, “FC”; Employment (in 
10,000 of persons) at 2007, “Emp”. 
 
We  estimate  the  degree  of  association  between  the  variables  in  terms  of  their linear 
dependence. We do not assume any aprioristic cause-and-effect relationship between them. 
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Table 3 
GDP, FDIs and employment in 30 Chinese cities 
  Source: China Data Online (2010), at chinadataonline.org 
Table 4 
Correlation between institutional variables and economic indicators*  
The  degree  of  association  between  the degree  of transaction costs generated  by business 
regulations  (i.e.,  institutional performance)  and  GDP,  GDPpc,  II  ind  (manufacturing),  III  ind 
(services),  FC  (our  proxy  for  FDI)  is  strong.  Such  results  provide  preliminary  evidence  in 
support  of  the  underlying  assumption  in  Doing  Business:  firms  typically  grow  more  (GDP, 
GDPpc),  attract  more  FDI  and  employ more  workers  (Emp)  in  the  presence  of  lower 
transaction  costs  associated  to legal requirements for starting and running a business. As 
expected, the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy are crucial for similar analyses. In 
some  cases  the  correlation  values  are  considerably  low  or  irrelevant:  for  example,  for  the 
association between institutional performance and, respectively, Emp (employment) and I ind 
(primary industry). 
 
Note in Figure 1 the shape of the fitted lines of correlations between institutional performance 
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  ∆GDP          I ind              II ind             II ind          GDPpc         Emp         ∆GDPpc 
   GDP  I ind  II ind  III ind 
Ease Doing Business in China  0.655  -0.049  0.642  0.698 
   GDPpc  ∆GDPpc  FC  Emp 
Ease Doing Business in China  0.868  -0.548  0.835  0.583 
* Log transformation  
 
 
 
and, respectively, logarithms of GDP and Emp. If we take the latter variables as our dependent 
variables and the institutional percentile rankings as explaining  the simple regressions, then 
exponential,  rather  than  linear  models  would  produce  slightly  better  results  in  terms  of 
goodness of fit. 
 
The  shape  of  the  fitted  lines  suggests  the  existence  of  a  higher  association  between 
institutional variables and economic performance in those cities that perform  better  in  terms of 
business  regulations:  this  element  becomes  relevant  when  we  discuss  about  exports  in 
section 4. 
 
This interpretation finds further support in the fact   that the four large municipalities of Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing get high values of the ease of doing business but relatively 
low values of GDP. This is because the levels  of  GDP  in  these  municipal  areas  (calculated 
on  the  municipal  scale)  are  lower  than  in  the  larger  areas,  such  as  provinces  and 
autonomous  regions  (calculated  at  provincial  or  regional  levels).  If  we  consider  that 
manufacturing represents a large share of the Chinese economy, this is no surprise: we can 
assume that the bigger the geographic area that we consider, the higher is the number of firms 
and the level of GDP in that area. Adjusting for such a circumstance allows to provide stronger 
empirical support. 
Fig.1 - Business regulations and logarithms of GDP and Emp 
 
It is somewhat unexpected the negative correspondence between business regulations and 
variation  in  the  percentage  of  GDPpc  between  1996  and  2008  (- 0.548).  Djankov et  al. 
(2006),  for  example,  suggest  that  countries  with  better  business  regulations  grow  faster: 
according to these authors moving from the worst  quartile of  business regulation to the best 
implies a 2.3 percentage point increase in annual growth
1). 
 
How do we explain such poor results with regards to Chinese cities? In all evidence  the  catch-
up  effect  is  strong.  As  well  known,  GDPpc  increases  at  a faster rate in developing areas 
than in developed ones. Thus, all regional economies should eventually converge. One reason 
to expect this effect to take place is that workers in poor regions have little access to capital, so 
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  1)  Note that the tests carried out by Djankov et al. (2006) provide a very poor indication that 
business  regulations  are  statistically  associated  to  the  rate  of  growth  of  GDPpc:  the  R-squared  is 
surprisingly low, with a value of 0.09 for the basic regression model.  
 
 
 
their productivity is generally low;  huge gains in productivity would result from  only a small 
increase  in  the  amount  of  capital.  Otherwise,  developed  areas  (with  high levels of capital 
and  high  levels  of  productivity)  would  enjoy  much  smaller  gains  from  similar  increases  in 
capital. 
 
To discern the impact of more efficient business regulations on the rates of urban and  regional 
growth  it  would  have  been  useful  to  have  a  longer  time  series, across several decades, 
and information on further variables. However, the quite recent transition from a planned to a  
mixed    economy  does not allow  for  a  historical  inquiry  into  the  interdependence  between 
institutional change and economic outcomes at urban and provincial levels. 
 
Trade, market size and better institutions 
 
But  what  does  it  induce  alterations  in  the  basic  institutional framework?  To  North long-run 
trade plays a major role. In our view, the answer to such a research question  might  shed 
some  light  on  the causal relationship  between  institutions and economic performance. 
 
According  to  the  export-base  framework,  a  region’s  economic  activities  fall  into two  broad 
categories:  those  related  to  production  for  the  export  market,  and those that produce for 
the local market. The prosperity of a geographic area depends on the success of the former 
(North 1955). Theoretically, activities related to export constitute  the export-base, that is, the 
major   autonomous variable determining  the level  of  regional  GDP. Given  these  (basic  or) 
export activities,  the  level  of  (non-basic  or)  domestic  activities  follows.  At  an  applied 
level, two kinds of limitations need to be considered: one is related to the methodology
2), the 
other  is  related  to  the  geographical  dimension.  There  is  unanimous  agreement  that  the 
significance  of  exports  to  explain  regional  income  levels  depends  also  on  the  size  of  the 
region.  For  example,  in  large  regions  with  high  levels  of  internal  trade  the  quantitative 
relevance  of  exports  decreases. Therefore,  it  is fundamental  to  define  functional economic 
areas: areas with well-defined  metropolitan  cores,  surrounded  by  non-metropolitan  areas 
(see  Beyers 2005)
3).  We  use  the  administrative  municipality  as  the  level  of  aggregation 
to define the export-base of Chinese cities. 
 
Exports  of  Chinese  cities  represent  a  good  proxy  for  long-run  trade.  Several methods  are 
available to estimate exports: the assumption method,  the location quotient (LQ) approach, 
and the minimum requirements approach
4). For the purpose of this paper we use LQ and data 
on  employment  estimated  for  14 industries  at  the  urban  level
5).  We  are  aware  of  the 
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  2)  Exports  are  not  the  most  important  autonomous  variable  determining  regional  income: 
business  investment,  government  expenditure  and  the  volume  of  residential  construction  represent 
fundamental levers. 
  3)  In  his  work  on  the  economic  base  of  regional  economies  in  the  United  States,  Beyers 
aggregates  the  3,141  counties  into  172  regions, most  of which  have  a metropolitan core  and  a  non-
metropolitan periphery. 
  4)  Our  location  quotient  approach  (LQ)  develops  around  the  interpretation  of  this  ratio:  LQ  = 
(eim  /  em) /  (Ein  /  En), where  eim =  employment  in  industry  i  at  municipal  level;  em   =  total 
employment  at  municipal  level;  Ein = employment in industry i at national level (the benchmark); En  = 
total employment at national level. 
  5) The 14 sectors are (within parentheses the abbreviation used in Table 6): Farming, Forestry,  
Animal Husbandry, Fishery (LQ1); Mining and Quarrying (LQ2); Manufacturing (LQ3); Electric Power, Gas 
and Water Production  and  Supply  (LQ4);  Construction  (LQ5);  Transportation,  Storage,  Post  and 
Telecommunications (LQ6); Wholesale & Retail Trade (LQ7); Banking and Insurance (LQ8); Real Estate 
(LQ9); Social Services (LQ10); Public Management and Social Organization (LQ11); Scientific Research,   
 
 
 
growing  contribution  of  the tertiary  sector  (services)  to  the  export-base:  Beyers  and 
Alvine  (1985)  show within producer services the strength of the traded component, and it is 
now recognised that many lines of services are based on demand from both local clients  and 
those  located  at  a  distance.  However,  this  applies  less  to  Chinese  cities  where  the 
relevance  of  the  secondary  industry  is  unquestionable:  the  sum of all the location quotients 
calculated at the urban level for manufacturing shows the highest scores as 89,363 compared 
to  7,754  for  “Transportation,  Storage,  Posts  and  Telecommunications”,  48,912  for  
“Wholesale &  Retail  Trade” and 54,061 for “Banking and Insurance”. 
 
Therefore, lacking a more detailed classification of “producer services” (those service activities 
with a more developed traded component, see Beyers 2005) we include “Manufacturing” (LQ3) 
in the calculation of the LQs (this choice is consistent with several studies on China’s industrial 
structure and exports). 
 
Exports  are  positively  correlated  to GDP  (r  is  0.648)  and  to  our  institutional  variable  (r  is 
0.532).  As  mentioned  above,  the  shape  of  the  fitted  lines  between  the  potential  for 
manufacturing exports (LQ3) and, respectively, GDP and business regulations, would suggest 
the use of quadratic, rather than simple linear, regression models. In Figure 2 we excluded the 
outliers of Hainan, Ningxia and  Qinghai  with  very  low GDP  levels. We  also observe  that  a 
higher coefficient of  correlation between exports and GDP might be obtained by considering 
that the four large municipalities present relatively lower income values (below the fitted line) 
compared to larger (provincial or regional) areas. 
Fig. 2 - Exports and GDP, and business regulations quadratic  
 
Moreover, there is a cluster of outliers, which include the areas of Qinghai, Yunnan, Ningxia, 
Inner Mongolia, Hainan and Shanxi. These areas are located predominantly in the centre of 
China, have poor  business regulations and low performance at the urban level in  terms  of 
exports:  omitting  these  observations,  the  correlation  coefficient  of  exports  and  business 
regulations increases to 0.625. 
 
The fact that exports are correlated to efficient business regulations is in line with evidence in 
McMillan and Woodruff (1999): according to these authors firms are more likely to make use of 
better institutions (in their study, written contracts to protect transactions) when their customers 
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Technical Service and Geologic Prospecting (LQ12); Management of Water Conservancy, Environment 
and Public Facilities (LQ13); Health, Social Security and Social Welfare (LQ14). 
b)  a)  
 
 
 
are located distantly. Also Hu and Qiu (2010) corroborate such a result by finding that Chinese 
firms with a considerable percentage of business outside their main location are more likely to 
use formal contracts. 
 
Is this a preliminary finding in favour of  the North’s thesis about induced alterations  in  the 
institutional  framework  of  a  certain  agglomeration?  Of  course, we use the current level of 
exports as proxy for the initial capacity of the urban agglomerations to trade on the long-run. 
As mentioned in section 1 coastal cities perform better, in terms of business regulations, than 
cities in other geographic regions.  In  the  next  section  we  make  use  of  this  information  to  
add  a geographical variable, the inverse of closeness to sea times the number of ports, to 
investigate the causal relationship between business regulations and income levels. 
 
Discussion of results 
 
We have provided some correlations, pure “symmetric” relationships, and tested the following 
statements: 
 
- exports are positively associated to economic performance (i.e., to logarithm of GDP; rexp-eco 
= 0.648); 
- business  regulations  are  positively  associated  to  economic  performance  (including  GDP 
levels (rinst-eco = 0.655), amount of FDI, levels of formal employment, and so on); 
- exports are positively associated to institutional performance (rexp-inst  = 0.532 or 0.625). 
 
Next  we  concentrate  on  the  correlation  between  exports  and  GDP  to  provide some 
insights on the  central role  of  business  regulations. Once  we  ascertained the existence of a  
link also between exports and institutional variables, we became  suspicious  about  the  first 
correlation:  What  can  we  conclude  about  the relationship between exports and GDP? The 
coefficient of correlation between exports and GDP (oberved at the local level) is different from  
zero  and  significant  (0.648).  According  to  the  export-base  frame,  regional  long-run  growth 
depends  on  the  success  of  its  exports.  However,  we  might  suspect  that  the  coefficient  of 
correlation  could  derive  from  “spurious”  causes.  We  thus  introduce  our  third  variable, 
institutional  performance,  and  conjecture  that  it  might  account  for  the  observed  correlation 
between exports and GDP. 
 
We compute the partial correlation between exports and GDP, with the institutional variable 
held constant, and compare it with the zero-order correlation: since the former is significantly 
lower  (rexp-eco.inst =  0.469) and the latter is not, we could conclude: a) that institutions are an 
intervening  variable  (the  supposed  causal  effect  of  exports  on  GDP  operates  through 
business  regulations),  or  b) that rexp-eco  results from the hypothesized joint causal effect of 
institutions on both (exports and GDP) and, hence, this correlation is spurious. 
 
Restraining from theoretical propositions we could not say whether the causal arrow runs from 
exports to institutions or vice versa, from institutions to economic performance  or  vice  versa, 
and  from  economic  performance  to  exports  or  vice versa. Without time series data for our 
institutional  variable,  we  cannot  apply  the  Granger  causality  test  and  with  no  further 
information  at  regional,  provincial  and  local  level  we  cannot  make  use  of  instrumental 
variables. Therefore, we cannot know  whether  we  have  case  a)  or  case  b).  Relying  on  the 
different  theoretical  frames  presented  above  and  summarized  in  Table  5,  we  can  assume 
asymmetric (i.e., set the causal arrows for) relationships as on the graphs in Figure 3. More 
specifically, we can check for the fitness of cases a) and b), exclude the latter (as in North 
1991  which  assumes  that  exports  bring  institutions,  and  not  the  reverse)  and  accept  the 
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former: institutions are  an  intervening  variable,  that is  the causal effect of exports on GDP 
operates also through business regulations.  
Table 5 
Theoretical propositions at stake  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In other words, what would matter for China’s long-run growth is not just the volume of exports 
or  the  “quality”  of  these  exports  or  the  subsidization  of  investments  in  new  products  (see 
Rodrick 2006 and Herrerias and Orts 2010 among many others): also business regulations are 
crucial.  This  would  suggest  that  simplified  and  less  costly  ways  of  implementing  existing 
regulations (such as completing business start-up formalities in a one-stop shop or lower cost 
bureaucracy) exert an essential role in the sustainability of China’s export- oriented model. And 
this has evident implications at the urban as well as the national levels. 
Fig. 3 - Exports and GDP: a spurious correlation? 
 
If we do not rely on any theoretically assumed causal relationships, we need to test a 2SLS 
model  between  business  regulations  (dependent)  and  exports  (independent,  instrumented 
variable) making use of the inverse of closeness to sea  of  each capital times  the number  of 
ports  in  the  related  province  (closeport)  as  instrumental  variable.  In  literature  several 
geographical/ecological variables have been used as instruments in investigating the causal 
relationship between institutions and economic outcomes: settler mortality, population density 
in 1500, latitude, landlock area, and so on. 
 
Attempting  to estimate the causal effect of  exports on business regulations, we derive that 
closeport affects the latter only through its effect on the former. If the instrument only affects 
business regulations because it affects exports (holding other variables in the model fixed), 
correlation  between  the  geographical  variable  and  business  regulations  is  evidence  that 
exports  cause  changes  in  the  business  regulatory  environment.  This  instrument  has  the  
property that changes in closeport are associated with changes in exports (exp) but do not lead 
to change in business regulations (inst), aside from the indirect route via exports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 - Instrumental variable, exports and institutions  
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“North 1955” (Export-base)  Exports bring GDP 
“North 1981” (Institutional perspective)  Institutions bring GDP 
“North 1991”  Exports bring institutions  
 
 
 
Closeport  is  associated  with  exports  but  not  with  the  error  term  (u)  of  the  OLS 
regression model with dependent variable inst and exp as single regressor
6). Results 
of the 2SLS regression model are encouraging as shown in table 6 and, despite the 
very  limited  number  of  observed  Chinese  cities,  invite  to  further  empirical 
investigation. 
Table 6 
Instrumental variable (2SLS) regression  
 
Since  urban  “essentials”  determine  regional  and  national  prosperity  and  growth,  cities  are 
fundamental levers, characterised not only in terms of tangible (i.e., transport infrastructures) 
but also in terms of intangible assets, business regulations and their administrative procedures, 
as well as human and social capital, etc (on the relevance of institutional capital, knowledge  
capital  and human  capital  as  a  driving  force  of  China’s  economic  development  see Wang 
and Hu 2007; on a more general level, see World Bank 2000). 
 
The  shape  of  the  fitted  lines  is  interesting:  here  we  refer  to  figure  2  (b),  which combines  
exports  and  institutional  performance.  It  appears  that  business  regulations  are  strongly  
correlated to local exports, but not with the same  intensity everywhere: all cities export, prosper 
and grow but it seems that in some areas institutions are not one of the factors associated to 
the competitive advantage or, if present, carry less weight. 
 
Let consider our data on Chinese cities (cross-section) as a time-series in which each data per 
city represent different steps in the evolution of a benchmark urban area, which changes and 
develops over time. Let us assume that the values attached to the most developed cities, such 
as Nanjing and Chongqing, represent the last steps in this urban transformation (replicating the 
North’s reasoning  in section 2  on the implications  of  long  distance trade),  while  the values 
attached to the least developed areas correspond to its first stages. The result, as seen, are 
non-linear  or  “kinked”  (linear  with  discontinuities)  curves  depicting  the  relationship  between  
exports and business regulations:  there  is no one single model applicable to all geographic 
areas. 
 
From this point of view we suggest that if until recently the benchmark urban area has grown 
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Source  SS  df  MS  Number of obs = 30       
   F (1, 28) = 7.12       
Model  .219  1  .219  Prob > F = 0.012       
Residual  .846  28  .030  R-squared = 0.205       
   Adj R-squared = 
0.177 
     
Total  1.065  29  .036  Root MSE = .174       
           
inst  Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P>t  [95% Conf.  Interval] 
exp  -.342  .128  -2.67  0.013  -.606  -.079 
_cons  .720  .114  6.29  0.000  .486  .955 
Instrumented: exp          
Instruments: closeport          
  6)  The second assumption excludes the instrument from being a regressor in the model for inst, 
since if instead inst depended on both exp and closeport and inst is regressed on exp alone then closeport 
is being absorbed into u so that the instrument will then be correlated with the error.  
 
 
 
based on poor or no business regulations, to continue its development along a sustainable  
path, it must exploit efficient business regulations. This applies  to  studies  comparing  urban  as 
well  as  country  level  data,  and  calls  for further  theoretical  and  empirical  investigations. 
Our  small  sample  of  Chinese cities shows that there are two clusters: one containing those 
cities  that  perform  better  in  economic  performance  (basically,  exports)  and  business 
regulations terms, and one that includes those cities that perform less well. 
Table 6 
Export-base in Chinese cities (location quotients)  
  Source: China Data Online (2010), at chinadataonline.org  
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